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THE RIGHT TO NONDISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTION:
THE EFFECT OF ANNOUNCED SCREENING POLICIES

The prosecutor has traditionally enjoyed great discretion
in making his charging decisions.' Justifications for his
largely unreviewable power 2 include the separation of powers
doctrine, 3 the state prosecutor's ultimate responsibility to the
electorate, 4 and the hesitancy of courts to interfere in an area
particularly in need of the prosecutor's expertise. 5 A claim of
discriminatory or bad faith prosecution should afford a review of the decision to prosecute, but few defendants will
prevail because they must carry the heavy burden of proving
"intentional and purposeful discrimination. '6 Although previous suggestions 7 for making this defense more accessible to
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-91

(1969) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; see, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 61. See
generally F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME (1969) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
2. DAVIS at 188-91; MILLER at 154-72. But see LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8
(granting the right to the attorney general to seek judicially-authorized
intervention for cause in a district attorney's actions in criminal matters);
LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 61-62. See generally Comment, The Ramifications of
United States v. Falk On Equal Protection from Prosecutorial Discrimination, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 62, 65-67 (1974) (detailing alternative
methods of curtailing prosecutorial discretion).
3. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965). See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
But see DAVIS at 210.
4. MILLER at 168. But see DAVIS at 207-08.
5. See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. Newman
v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But cf. DAVIS 209-10.
6. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); United States v. Berrios, 501
F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
7. Suggestions include: (1) reducing the quantum of eyidence needed to
prove a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement, as was done in jury
selection discrimination cases, Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection
Principles to Selective Enforcement of the CriminalLaw, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88,
106-23 [hereinafter cited as Givelber]; cf. United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d
1243 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); (2)
treating the question whether the prosecution was discriminatory as a fact
for the jury, Note, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 318 (1973). Contra, United States v.
Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); and (3) facilitating the defendant's
access to evidence of discriminatory enforcement by allowing in camera inspection of the prosecutor's memoranda and questioning of the prosecutor
about his motives, Comment, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory
Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 648; see United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
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the defendant have not been followed, relief for the victim of
discriminatory prosecution s may be found in announced
screening policies such as objective pretrial intervention
criteria.9
In the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,10 the United
States Supreme Court upheld an equal protection challenge
to discriminatory administration of a law," explaining:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the pro12
hibition of the Constitution.
Oyler v. Boles 3 confirmed the applicability of Yick Wo to the
prosecutor. 14 However, in continued deference to the prosecutor's broad discretion, successful assertion of the defense
8. The terms "discriminatory prosecution," "discriminatory enforcement," and "selective enforcement" will be used to mean deliberate selection
of a defendant for prosecution on the basis of some unjustifiable standard, as
distinguished from the mere conscious selection between suspects for reasons
that are permissible.
9. The term "pretrial intervention" is used here to denote a formal program that diverts certain offenders from the course of criminal
prosecution by use of procedures observable to the public and administered
by professionals, with emphasis on rehabilitation and counseling in lieu of
punishment. See generally R. NIMMER, DIVERSIONS: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION (1974); Peterson, The Dade County Pretrial Intervention Project: Formalization of the Diversion Function and Its
Impact Upon the Criminal Justice System, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 86 (1973).
Criteria for admission to a program administered by the District Attorney of
East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, include: age between 17 and 25, no
prior arrests as an adult, charged with a nonviolent offense, restitution to
the victim, and consent of victim and arresting officer. Pretrial Intervention
Program Federal Grant Application to Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Oct., 1975; address by East Baton
Rouge Parish District Attorney Ossie Brown, Louisiana State University
Criminal Justice Seminar, Oct. 24, 1975.
10. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
11. For exhaustive treatment of the right to equal protection in criminal
prosecutions, see generally Givelber; Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
12. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
13. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
14. Id. at 456 (dictum). See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1961).
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has usually been thwarted1 5 by requiring an unmistakable
showing of discrimination before examining the prosecutor's
motives.
The defendant must first establish that he was prosecuted while other offenders known to the prosecutor were not,
though they were similarly situated in all respects except the
impermissible reason for selection. 16 The second element of
the defense is that the selection be deliberately based on an
unjustifiable standard.1 7 Clearly, discrimination on the basis
of race or religion is prohibited,'1 8 as is prosecution aimed at
preventing the exercise of a constitutional right.19
Several factors have fortified the barriers confronting the
defendant. The prosecutor's enforcement decision is presumed nondiscriminatory, 20 and this presumption blocks all
but the strongest claims, because the prosecutor usually controls the necessary evidence. 21 United States v. Falk22 struck
a balance by shifting to the prosecutor the burden of going
forward with the evidence "when a defendant alleges inten15. MILLER at 157; Givelber at 90.
16. E.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 628 (7th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion). It
should no longer be necessary for the defendant to prove that the discrimination was directed at a class of which he is a member. United States v. Falk,
479 F.2d 616, 619, 626 n.2 (7th Cir. 1973); Comment, supra note 2 at 64, 67 n.64
and cases cited therein. But cf. Comment, supra note 7 at 656, in which the
author, in speaking of proof by implication from a pattern of enforcement
alone, points out that claims of discriminatory enforcement against an individual usually fail because "a court will have difficulty discovering what
particular standard the prosecutor used for selection."
17. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (dictum). See, e.g., United
States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
19. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d
1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
See also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (dictum) (any "arbitrary
classification" is an unjustifiable standard).
20. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). Underlying the presumption
is a fear that requiring the prosecutor to prove good faith without first
demanding a strong showing of discriminatory enforcement from the defendant would provide too ready a tool of delay and would drain prosecutorial
resources. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1963); Givelber at 104-05.
21. Givelber at 112; Comment, supra note 7, at 661. See United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1972).
22. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
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tional purposeful discrimination and presents facts sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose
....
23 However, later cases have distinguished Falk easily,
because few defendants have presented evidence as persua24
sixe as the defendant's in that case.
Although a statistical comparison of unprosecuted violators with the defendant or his class might justify an inference of deliberate selection, such evidence is seldom found
sufficient to prove impermissible purpose. 25 This evidentiary
insufficiency hampers the defendant because statistical evidence is often the only kind available; 26 even allowing discovery and in camera examination of the prosecutor's memoranda will not uncover direct evidence of unjustifiable discrimination, because a prosecutor would not record his rea27
sons for a suspect decision.
Announced screening policies provide a means for defendants to overcome these evidentiary problems. What the prosecutor has announced he will do is persuasive evidence of
what he has later done, especially when used against him. 28 A
23. Id. at 620-21. The court expected the Assistant United States Attorney, who allegedly had stated that the prosecution was motivated by the
desire to penalize the defendant for his draft counseling activities, to be
available for questioning by the defendant at the hearing upon remand.
24. E.g., United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975). See text at notes 40-42 infra, detailing the Falk
circumstances.
25. Comment, supra note 7, at 654-57. But see Givelber at 117 n.118.
Professor Givelber's comparison of the cases finding discriminatory selection
of jurors,.see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), with the discriminatory enforcement cases, places in doubt the heavy burden of proof
required of the defense in the latter. For example, if statistical evidence
shows that only members of his race were prosecuted, the court should shift
to the prosecutor the burden of going forward with evidence to prove that the
selection was not the result of purposeful racial discrimination.
26. Cf. Comment, supra note 2, at 65.
27. See generally United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1973) (weight given
to evidence showing a policy of not enforcing by criminal sanction, even
though the Supreme Court had invalidated the policy before the defendant's
indictment). Generally, policy statements are not binding on the agency. But
when the policy becomes detailed and objective, when its nature is similar to
an administrative rule, different considerations should apply. See DAVIS at
102-03. One commentator has argued that before the prosecutor can refute
claims of selective enforcement by pointing to a change in policy, he should
be required to prove that the defendant is merely the first example of a
return to enforcement against all violators. Comment, supra note 7, at 657.
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defendant who is prosecuted because he does not meet the
screening requirements, and who wishes to challenge this
basis of selection for prosecution as being a denial of equal
protection, should be allowed to proceed directly to the merits
of his claim. For example, if a criterion'states that the offender must belong to one particular race to qualify for diversion, a clear ground for challenge exists. The purpose of the
prosecution-the basis of the selection-appears on the face
of the standard, clearly entitling the defendant to relief since
29
the basis is unjustifiable.
For the defendant who is qualified for diversion and is
nevertheless prosecuted, the existence of open policy statements and guidelines, particularly detailed objective criteria
such as the pretrial intervention qualifications, will aid him
by foreclosing most of the prosecutor's traditional justifications for selective enforcement. The defendant will be able to
point to an easily identifiable class of persons situated similarly to him in all ways except for a difference he must identify as the unjustifiable basis of selection. Although some
situations will still present difficulties, 30 the many persons
who have escaped formal charging because they meet the
diversion criteria are significantly like the defendant in that
the characteristics the prosecutor believed to be most important for law enforcement purposes are present in both.
The functioning pretrial diversion program, with its list
of those who have entered the system, will prevent the prosecutor from convincing the court that others not prosecuted
have escaped because he lacked evidence sufficient to
charge. 3 1 Doubtful cases are not diverted, they are dismis29. More difficult is the question of what the defendant must prove if the
criterion does not on its face indicate that the selection was based on an
impermissible classification. Requiring the suspect to make restitution in
order to enter the program might be attacked as an impermissible classification on the basis of wealth. Peterson, supra note 9, at 110. The pretrial
intervention programs are probably not constitutionally infirm on this
ground, since they provide means for the participants to make restitution, by
allowing installment payment and by helping the offender to find a job.
Pretrial Intervention Program Grant Application, supra note 9; address by
District Attorney Brown, supra note 9; see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
30. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 1973) (dissenting
opinion) (arguing that since the defendant had not established that the
25,000 unprosecuted draft resisters had not also engaged in protected speech,
he had failed to prove that the prosecution was undertaken to prevent the
exercise of first amendment rights).
31. Cf. MILLER at 154-56, 158.
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sed,3 2 since diverting such cases would risk punishment of 33a
person whose guilt cannot be established by the prosecutor.
Lack of knowledge of other violators is clearly a valid
reason for not prosecuting all offenders. 34 Irrefutable evidence of the prosecutor's knowledge of other violators exists
if the defendant can point to offenders admitted to a pretrial
diversion program. Similarly, the Census Bureau's careful
procedures for internal reporting of others disobeying the
census laws has supported a finding that the Bureau must
have had knowledge of other violators besides the defendant.

35

Prior delineation of objective guidelines for diversion will
eliminate many of the subjective components of the prosecution decision. These components, calling for exercise of the
prosecutor's expertise, include deciding what is the most effective law enforcement policy generally, 36 the seriousness of
the offense measured against community enforcement pri38
orities, 37 and the degree of criminality.
Formulation of policies so detailed and objective as pretrial intervention criteria raises a presumption that the prosecutor has carefully considered all factors relevant to valid
law enforcement objectives. Therefore, later deviation from
diversion policies might indicate that the defendant was pro39
secuted for impermissible reasons.

Such deviations alone will not prove intentional and purposeful discrimination, 40 but several recent cases have cited
departures from established procedures as persuasive evi32. Address by District Attorney Brown, supra note 9.
33. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS Standards 1.1 & 2.1 (1973).
34. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); United States v. Baechler, 509
F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1974); see Pier I Imports, Inc. v. Pitcher, 270 So. 2d 228
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 272 So. 2d 696 (La. 1973) (prosecutor can
explain selective enforcement by showing a policy to prosecute only those
violators against whom a complaint has been filed, even though the prosecutor apparently had actual knowledge of other violations).
35. United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972).
36. See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): "Paramount among them [the elements in the decision to prosecute] is a
determination that a prosecution will promote the ends of justice, instill
respect for the law, and advance the cause of ordered liberty."
37. Id. at 635.
38. Id. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
39. See Comment, supra note 7, at 657.
40. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
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dence of discriminatory enforcement. In United States v.
Falk,,1 the fact that 25,000 others had returned their draft
cards without suffering criminal sanction counted heavily in
outweighing the prosecutor's excuses for prosecuting only the
defendant. However, the admission by an Assistant United
States Attorney of the desire to punish the defendant for his
draft counseling activities buttressed the defense arguments. 42 The review of the decision to prosecute by many high
officials, including those in the Department of Justice in
Washington, a markedly different procedure from normal decisions to prosecute which are handled at the lower echelons,
43
was also indicative that Falk had been singled out.
In United States v. Steele,44 the court held that the defendant's showing of the absence of prosecution of at least six
others who had not complied with the census requirements
had carried his burden of "present[ing] evidence which
created a strong inference of discriminatory prosecution"
aimed at restricting the defendant's public opposition to the
census and that the government was required to explain
away the apparent first amendment violation. 4 5 Though this
case loses some of its significance because the prosecution
relied on a bare assertion of prosecutorial discretion, 46 the
court's reliance on evidence that the Census Bureau had
compiled extensive background reports on the prosecuted
persons, contrary to the usual policy, 47 is noteworthy.
Another case shifted to the prosecutor the burden of
going forward with the evidence of nondiscriminatory motives upon proof of deviation from policy.4 s The defendants
had proved that they had been prosecuted for violating a
government regulation prohibiting disturbances and obstructions near public buildings, even though the government had
allowed several much noisier and more obstructive gatherings. 49 This deviation from the earlier permissiveness con41. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
42. See note 28, supra. The admission by this prosecutor, if uncorroborated, probably could not have carried the defendant's case. See Comment,
supra note 7, at 660.
43. 479 F.2d at 622.
44. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
45. Id. at 1152.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1974).
49. Id. Defendants who had held "masses for peace" in the public con-
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vinced the court that the defendants had established prima
facie that they had been refused consent to meet because
their views were disagreeable to the government.5 0 Therefore,
deviation from a lenient policy apparently will require close
scrutiny in future cases especially if the policies are so allembracing and objective as the pretrial intervention criteria.
There are other justifications for selection that will not be
foreclosed by use of announced policies. If the prosecutor has
made a systematic, good faith effort to prosecute a few highly
visible offenders to achieve effective deterrence with his limited resources, the prosecution of those defendants should
not be prevented by an equal protection claim.

51

The selection

on this basis will often be relevant to law enforcement purposes 52 and the possibility of abuse is slight since it will be
difficult to fabricate convincing proof of a systematic, good
53
faith program.
Because efficient use of prosecutorial resources is one of
the principal justifications for his broad discretion,5 4 the prosecutor who explains selective enforcement on that ground
will be very persuasive. However, if selection policies as comprehensive as the usual pretrial diversion criteria have been
announced, the prosecutor could be said to have already made
a careful assessment of his resources as to those crimes specified in the criteria. Thus, prosecution in spite of his diversion
policies is suspect, and courts should examine in detail this
particular selection. 55 Another valid explanation is that the
prosecutor wished to use a strong case to test the constitu56
tionality of uncertain law.

Reasoning from the few pertinent authorities, one finds
that announced screening policies such as the objective precourse of the Pentagon proved that the government had previously permitted
band concerts, a speech by the Vice-President, and religious gatherings.
50. Id. at 1078-79.
51. United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendants had been prosecuted for willful failure to file federal income tax returns, pursuant to an Internal Revenue Service plan called "Project Ace,"
which was designed to selectively enforce the criminal law against attorneys,
certified public accountants, and enrolled practitioners because of their "special obligation and responsibility to the tax laws"); see Givelber 117-21.
52. Givelber at 116 n.116.
53. Id. at 119-21 (suggesting an approach to examining such proof).
54. MILLER at 159.
55. But cf. United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972)
(random selection of cases for prosecution is permissible).
56. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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trial diversion criteria will aid the defendant substantially in
proving discriminatory prosecution. These sources imply
three possible degrees of impact. In some situations, when the
defendant fits well into the criteria and is nevertheless prosecuted, the court might infer from the absence of apparent,
justification that a discriminatory prosecution is under way
and so shift to the prosecutor the burden of disproving discriminatory purpose.57 Other courts, less willing'to discard
the presumption of a prosecutor's good faith, might only allow
the defendant a hearing or give him access to evidence that is
under the control of the prosecutor. 58 Finally, courts refusing
to accept the lead of cases like United States v. Falk5 9 will at
least recognize the narrowing of the prosecutor's field of justifiable reasons so that the defendant can forego disproving
the basic justifications such as lack of knowledge or lack of
60
evidence.
More limitation on the prosecutor's discretionary power
will not prevent him from effectively enforcing the law. Professor Davis points to West Germany as an example of a
criminal justice system in which there has been an almost
total divestment of discretion in enforcement. 6' Yet one major
difficulty is entailed in using the prosecutor's screening
policies to check his discretionary power. If closer scrutiny
does result, the prosecutor might determine that his re2
sources are inadequate to deal with the increased litigation
and might return to exercising his discretion in secret. With
the existing obstacles to reviewability of prosecutorial deci3
sions, there is probably nothing short of legislative mandate
to prevent him from doing so.
Fritz B. Ziegler
57. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456
F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
58. See generally Comment, supra note 7.
59. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
60. Doubt was expressed about the holding of Falk in United States v.
Ream, 491 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. DAVIS at 193-95. "Whenever the evidence that the defendant has
committed a serious crime is reasonably clear and the law is not in doubt, the
German prosecutor, unlike the American prosecutor, is without discretionary
power to withold prosqcution." (footnote and emphasis omitted).
62. See Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1963); Givelber 104-05.
63. See generally MILLER at 165-72. But see LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(B)
(arguably limiting legislative control of the prosecutor).

